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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines whether starting to import contributes to skill upgrading among Indonesian plants.
Our data records the distribution of years of employee schooling in each plant. We examine how starting to
import affects the demand for highly educated workers within and across production and non-production
occupations categories at the plant level. We estimate a model of importing and skill-biased technological
change in which selection into importing arises due to unobservable heterogenous returns from importing.
Both instrumental variable regression and marginal treatment effect estimates conﬁrm that importing has
substantially increased the relative demand for educated workers within each occupation. In contrast, we
do not consistently estimate a signiﬁcant impact of importing on the relative demand for non-production
workers.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Workhorse models of international trade almost universally
suggest that increased integration into international markets will
encourage resources to be reallocated towards workers, ﬁrms, or
industries in which the country has a comparative advantage. In
developing countries, for example, trade liberalization is often sup-
ported by the argument that trade will expand in labor-intensive
industries which, in turn, are predicted to increase the relative
demandandwages forunskilled labor. Surprisingly, inmanycontexts,
exactly the opposite has been found. Numerous studies conﬁrm that
among developing countries, trade liberalization has increased the
 The authors are grateful to the co-editor, Nina Pavcnik, and two anonymous
referees whose comments greatly improved the article. The authors also thank the
seminar participants at the Bank of Canada, UIBE, Purdue, Vanderbilt, Oklahoma,
Georgia Tech, Rocky Mountain Empirical Trade Conference, Hitotsubashi COE Confer-
ence on Trade and FDI, and the Conference in Honor of Bill Ethier for their helpful
comments. This research was supported by the SSHRC Insight Grants 435-2014-0505.
* Corresponding author at: Vancouver School of Economics, University of British
Columbia, 6000 Iona Drive, Vancouver, BC V6T 1L4, Canada.
relative plant-level demand for skilled labor (Sanchez-Paramo and
Schady, 2003; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007) and, likewise, has caused
the skill premium to rise (Harrison and Hanson, 1999; Gindling and
Robbins, 2001; Attanasio et al., 2004). Despite these stark trends, the
underlying cause of the increased demand for skilled workers, the
contribution from trade, and the implications for income inequality
remain key, unresolved issues (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005).1
This paper contributes to this literature by examining whether
starting to import foreign materials has an impact on the demand for
highly educated workers among Indonesian manufacturing plants
between 1996 and 2006. The idea that importing may affect ﬁrm
1 Our work is likewise related to studies of trade, employment and wages (Treﬂer,
2004; Gonsaga et al., 2006; Bernard et al., 2007; Egger and Kreikemeier, 2009; Davis
and Harrigan, 2011; Felbermayr et al., 2011; Amiti and Davis, 2012), studies of trade,
wages and the demand for skilled workers (Bernard and Jensen, 1997; Yeaple, 2005;
Verhoogen, 2008; Frías et al., 2009; Chor, 2010; Helpman et al., 2010; Bustos, 2011;
Cos¸ar, 2013; Vannoorenberghe, 2011), and studies of trade, wages and skill-biased
technological change (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999; Matsuyama, 2007; Costinot and
Vogel, 2010; Bloom et al., 2011; Burstein and Vogel, 2012; Burstein et al., 2013;
Parro, 2013).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.07.008
0022-1996/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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organization or productivity is neither new or controversial. Rather,
it is widely reported that using foreign intermediate goods in pro-
duction often requires the plant-level adoption of more sophisti-
cated technology, inducing skill-biased technological change (SBTC,
hereafter).2 The adoption of foreign technology, and thus importing
in a developing country, is likely to induce further structural changes
within individual manufacturing plants. In fact, there is a rich liter-
ature indicating that the reallocation of workers is strongly related
to changes in the demand for skilled labor within ﬁrms, rather than
across industries (Berman et al., 1994;Bernard and Jensen, 1997;
Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007). We extend this line of research by
relating changes in the relative use of educated workers within and
across occupations to observable decisions to import intermediate
materials at the plant-level.
Our data are exceptionally well suited to this objective. Typi-
cally, researchers have used variation in occupation categories, such
as non-production or white-collar workers, to construct a proxy for
skilled labor (Bernard and Jensen, 1997; Harrison and Hanson, 1999;
Pavcnik, 2003; Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007).3 Likewise, Amiti and
Cameron (2012) investigate the impact of trade liberalization on the
wages of production workers relative to non-production workers.
They ﬁnd that falling input tariffs has caused the wage of non-
productionworkers to fall relative to thewage of productionworkers
within Indonesian manufacturing ﬁrms that import their intermedi-
ate inputs. A major advantage of this paper’s study is that it is able
to capture a much more precise measure of skill at the plant-level in
a large, developing economy. Speciﬁcally, our panel data record the
education-level of every worker in every Indonesian manufacturing
plant with at least 20 employees. Moreover, we are able to distin-
guish the distribution of worker education across non-production
and production workers within each plant. Our data does not, how-
ever, record wages by worker education and, as such, we cannot
study the impact of importing on the education wage premium.
In the last two decades, Indonesia has experienced a large
increase in the supply of educated workers. In fact, using the bal-
anced panel of manufacturing plants, we ﬁnd that the plant-level
average share of educated workers—deﬁned as the workers with a
highschool diploma—increased by 14.5 percentage points between
1996 and 2006. When we decompose the overall increase in the
share of educated workers into the increase within occupation
2 This is particularly true when it is imported from industrialized nations for which
there is substantial evidence of skill-biased technological change. Doms et al. (1997)
provide evidence that the adoption of new factory automation technologies lead
to skill upgrading. Further, recent literature on trade and heterogeneous ﬁrms sug-
gests that importing foreign intermediate goods increases productivity. See Muendler
(2004), Amiti and Konings (2007), Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), Halpern et al. (2015),
and Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) among others. There is also signiﬁcant evidence
that skill-biased technological change can increase the skill-premium even in devel-
oping countries (e.g., Kijima, 2006). Burstein et al. (2013) provide an alternative model
whereby importing directly induces skill-biased technological change.
3 Important exceptions are Bustos (2011) and Koren and Csillag (2011). Using a
panel of Argentinean manufacturing ﬁrms with the detailed information on worker’s
education level Bustos (2011) ﬁnds that exporting increases the demand for skilled
labor, while our results suggest that importing, rather than exporting, is more impor-
tant for skill upgrading. Using Hungarian linked employer-employee data, Koren and
Csillag (2011) ﬁnd that the wage gap betweenworkers with a high school diploma and
those with primary schooling is larger among workers operating imported machines
than among workers operating domestic machines. Similarly, a number of studies
use linked data ﬁrm and employee data to establish a number of related ﬁndings. In
particular, Frazer (2013) examines the effect of importing on Rwandan manufactur-
ing wages, Hummels et al. (2014) characterizes the relationship between offshoring
and wages across skilled and unskilled Danish workers, Martins and Opromolla
(2009) investigates the impact of importing on Portugese manufacturing wages, while
Krishna et al. (2011) and Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) study how trade reform
affects Brazilian wages and worker displacement, respectively. Ebenstein et al. (2014)
examine the impact of offspring on US wages using CPS. While these studies offer
insight into the effect of importing on the workers’ wages or displacement, we exam-
ine the effect of importing on the relative employment of educated workers to less
educated workers at the plant-level.
categories and the increase due to reallocation between occupation
categories, we ﬁnd that the skill upgrading within production and
within non-production workers account for more than 95% of the
overall increase in the share of educated workers; the reallocation
from production to non-productionworkers account for less than 5%.
Since little of the skill-upgrading at the plant-level can be explained
by the reallocation of workers across occupations, existing studies
that focus on the relative demand for non-production workers to
productionworkers provide limited insight on how importing affects
the overall demand for educated workers. This paper contributes
to the literature by investigating the impact of importing on the
demand for educated workers within occupation categories.
Quantifying the impact that starting to import has on the demand
for educated workers requires overcoming a number of key empiri-
cal challenges. First, we are particularly concerned that the demand
for skill and the decision to import are endogenously determined.
We develop a number of detailed instruments to capture exogenous
variation in plant-level import shipping costs. We exploit this varia-
tion to identify robust IV estimates of the causal impact of importing
on the demand for skilled labor. Our IV results consistently indi-
cate that most within-ﬁrm education-based skill-upgrading occurs
within occupations. Moreover, traditional measures of skill upgrad-
ing in existing studies, such as the fraction of non-production work-
ers, tend to understate the degree of skill upgrading induced by
importing.
Second, we are also concerned that the unobservable impact of
trade on the demand for educated workers will vary substantially
across heterogeneous plants. For instance, importing foreign inter-
mediate goods may provide plants with an incentive to hire more
educatedworkers, but the degree of skill-upgradingmay depend cru-
cially on the plant’s existing, potentially unobserved, heterogeneous
ability to implement foreign technology. When the effect of import-
ing on the demand for skill varies across plants, there is no single
“effect” of importing on skill demand. Furthermore, we expect plants
with greater ability to adopt technology will self-select into import-
ing because these plants gain more from importing. This “selection
on gains” complicates estimation in general, and even a standard ﬁrst
differenced estimator is invalid as an estimator for the average treat-
ment effect because this source of the bias cannot be differenced out.
By applying the treatment effect framework developed by
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2007a, 2007b), we estimate the
Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE, hereafter) curve as well as vari-
ous summary measures of the impact of importing on the relative
demand for skilled labor in the Indonesian manufacturing sector,
such as the average effect among all plants (the average treatment
effect; the ATE, hereafter), the average effect among importers (the
treatment effect on the treated; the TT, hereafter), and the average
effect among non-importers (the treatment effect on the untreated;
the TUT, hereafter).
The estimated MTE curve is well above zero and downward slop-
ing, where the latter feature provides direct evidence that the impact
of importing on the demand for educated workers varies across
plants (i.e., the coeﬃcient is random) and plants that receive a larger
idiosyncratic gain from importing are more likely to start import-
ing. The estimates of the ATE, the TT, and the TUT of importing on
the demand for educated workers are signiﬁcantly positive. Further-
more, the TT is consistently estimated to be substantially larger than
the ATE, which, in turn, is estimated to be larger than the TUT. This
suggests that, on average, the effect of importing among plants that
have chosen to import is substantially larger than that among plants
that have chosen not to import in our sample. These ﬁndings are
not just of academic interest, but imply that while importing may
have had an important impact on the demand for educated work-
ers among plants that were induced to import in our sample, it is
unclear that further policy change will greatly affect the demand for
educated workers among new importers.
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In the presence of heterogenous effects, the instrumental variable
(IV) estimator identiﬁes the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE),
which is the average effect of importing among plants induced to
change their import status by an instrument (Imbens and Angrist,
1994). However, the plants that are induced to start importing by an
instrument may be different from the plants that would have been
induced to start importing by a policy change.We use the framework
of Carneiro et al. (2010) to study the average impact of further policy
changes on the demand for educatedworkers among the set of plants
induced to import by the change in policy. The results suggest that
further policy changes that promote importingwould have increased
the demand for educated workers among the plants induced to start
importing, but these changes are smaller than that implied by the TT
or our IV estimates.
The next section describes our empirical model and the nature of
selection. Section 3 describes our data set and documents the rela-
tionship between importing and plant-level skill-intensity. Section 4
describes the empirical results. The last section concludes.
2. A simple model of importing, selection and SBTC
Consider a simple two-country model of importing where home
(Indonesian) ﬁrms consider whether or not to import from abroad.
Consumers have CES preferences and themarket structure ismonop-
olistic competition. A home ﬁrm producing variety y faces home
demand q(y) = B(Zd)p(y)−g where q is quantity demanded, p is the
output price, g is the elasticity of substitution, and Zd is a vector of
observed variables that serve as a demand shifter.4
Firms hire capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor on competi-
tive factormarkets and combine themwith intermediatematerials —
purchased domestically or imported — to produce output according
to the production function
f (K,M, Ls, Lu,A,v) = vKakMam
{
[ALs](s−1)/s + L
(s−1)/s
u
}als/(s−1)
, (1)
where K is capital, M is total intermediate materials, Ls is the num-
ber of skilled workers, Lu is the number of unskilled workers, s >1
is elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers,
v is a Hicks neutral productivity term, and A is a skilled labor aug-
menting technology term. For notational simplicity we abstract from
differences across occupations, though allowing differences across
production and non-production workers is straightforward.
To consider the potential impact of importing on the relative
demand for skilled workers, we allow foreign imported inputs to
affect the level of skilled labor augmenting technology as
lnA(X,D, b˜) = Db˜+ Xc˜′ + U˜, (2)
where D is a dummy variable for the use of imported inputs, b˜ is
a ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameter that captures the effect of importing on
skill-biased technology A, X is a vector of observables (to be speciﬁed
later), and U˜ is a skill-biased technology shock. The skill biased tech-
nology term A depends on X and the import decision D as in Eq. (2)
but we assume that importing does not affect the Hicks neutral
technology level v.5
4 We abstract from the possibility of exporting for the moment, though it will be
straightforward to extend our framework to allow for it. We can also directly extend
the model to allow for unobserved demand/cost shifters.
5 It is also possible to allow importing to improve Hicks-neutral productivity or
product quality. We abstract from the former possibility only for expositional sim-
plicity, while the latter consideration leads to a similar estimating equation. Although
we investigate different mechanisms which drive skill upgrading through imports,
import-induced skill-biased technological changemay operate through either produc-
tivity or product quality.
For simplicity, we assume constant returns to scale technology
where the plant’s marginal cost is determined by
c(A,v) = min
Ls ,Lu ,K,M
WsLs +WuLu +WkK +WmM
subject to f (Ls, Lu,K,M,A,v) ≥ 1 (3)
and (Ws,Wu,Wk,Wm) is a vector of factor prices. If the plant chooses
to import, it incurs a ﬁxed import cost fm(Zc) where Zc contains a
vector of observed variables that determine the ﬁxed cost. Then the
plant’s net proﬁt function is p(A, Zd, Zc,v,D) = r(A, Zd,v) − Dfm(Zc),
where r(A, Zd,v) = maxq pq− c(A,v)q. A ﬁrm will import whenever
the net proﬁt from importing is greater than the net proﬁt achieved
using domestic materials alone,
Dp
(
X, Zd, Zc,v, b˜
)
:= p
(
A
(
X, 1, b˜
)
, Zd, Zc,v, 1
)
− p
(
A
(
X, 0, b˜
)
, Zd, Zc,v, 0
)
≥ 0. (4)
Note that Dp(X, Zd, Zc,v, b˜) is strictly increasing in b˜ and v.
Suppose we allow b˜ to vary across plants as
b˜ = ¯˜b+ 4˜,
where ¯˜b is the mean of b˜ and 4˜ is the plant-speciﬁc return to import-
ing. Then, for each value of X, Zd, Zc, and v, it is straightforward to
determine a threshold value of b˜ that induces ﬁrms to start import-
ing by the condition Dp(X, Zd, Zc,v, b˜∗) = 0. This threshold value
b˜∗ depends on X, Zd, Zc, and v. Naturally, ﬁrms with low initial
productivity vwill require larger values of b˜ to justify importing.6
Under the assumption of heterogeneous returns to importing, we
can illustrate the selection mechanism by considering the locus of
b˜’s for the marginal importer. Fig. 1 (a) demonstrates that this locus
is strictly decreasing in initial Hicks-neutral productivity, v, while
ﬁxing the value of X, Zd, and Zc. Firms with lowHicks-neutral produc-
tivity (i.e., low value of v) choose to import only if they receive high
idiosyncratic returns from importing (i.e., high value of b˜).
2.1. Selection, SBTC and skill demand
Consider the ﬁrst order conditions from cost minimization
problem (3). Denote the log of the demand for skilled workers rela-
tive to unskilled workers by SD = ln(Ls/Lu) for D ∈ {0, 1}, where the
subscript D indicates its dependence on import status. Given mar-
ket wages, the relative demand for skilled workers is determined by
equating the ratio of the marginal product of skilled and unskilled
workers to the ratio of their wages as
SD = (s − 1) lnA − s ln(Ws/Wu)
= Db+ Xc′ + U
= D(b¯+ 4) + Xc′ + U, (5)
where
(
b, b¯, 4,c,U
)
are
(
b˜
s−1 ,
¯˜
b
s−1 ,
4˜
s−1 ,
c˜
s−1 ,
U˜
s−1
)
and X subsumes
ln(Ws/Wu). In our context, importing is an endogenous decision
because the import decision D and skill-biased technology shock U
are likely to be correlated. Moreover, as indicated in Eq. (4), plants
with a greater ability to adopt skilled-biased technology (i.e., high
value of b) will self-select into importing because they will achieve
larger productivity gains from importing. Therefore, b and D are also
correlated.
6 This argument is analogous to that in Lileeva and Treﬂer (2010) which studies the
heterogeneous return to exporting on Hicks-neutral productivity.
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Fig. 1. Importing and skill demand.
Because of this positive sorting on the gain from importing, we
would expect that the change in skill demand will be greater among
plants that choose to import relative to non-importers should they
have started importing. As illustrated in Fig. 1 (b), and similar to
Fig. 1 (a), the effect of importing on demand for skill for the marginal
importer is a decreasing function of Hicks-neutral productivity v.
2.2. The marginal treatment effect
We are interested in identifying the impact of importing on the
demand for skilled labor, b, which may vary across plants. Imbens
and Angrist (1994) show that, under certain conditions, using a sin-
gle dummy instrument, an IV estimator identiﬁes the local average
treatment effect (LATE), or the average value of b among plants who
are induced to change their import choices by the instrument. When
multiple dummy instruments are used, an IV estimator identiﬁes
a weighted average of the instrument-speciﬁc LATEs. Therefore, an
IV estimator provides an estimate of an interpretable quantity even
when the effect of importing on the demand for skilled workers is
heterogenous across plants, although the LATE is generally different
from the average value of b.
To evaluate the heterogeneous impact of importing on the
demand for skill, we use the framework developed by Heckman and
Vytlacil (1999, 2005, 2007a, 2007b) as follows. The relative demand
for skilled labor SD for D = 0 or 1 can be written as
S1 = l1(X) + U1 and S0 = l0(X) + U0, (6)
respectively, where, allowing for the average value of b to depend on
X in Eq. (5), l1(X) ≡ E[S1|X] = b¯(X) + Xc′ and l0(X) ≡ E[S1|X] = Xc′
while U1 = 4 + U and U0 = U. The impact of importing on the
demand for skilled workers depends on the plant-speciﬁc ability
to adopt foreign technology embedded in imports since S1 − S0 =
b¯(X) + U1 − U0.
To derive an empirical speciﬁcation for the decision to import,
let Z ≡ (X, Zd, Zc,v) and write Eq. (4) as Dp(Z, b˜) ≡ Dp(X, Zd, Zc,v, b˜).
Deﬁne the latent variable, D∗, as D∗ = Dp(Z, b˜) = lD(Z) − V , where
lD(Z) = E[Dp(Z, b˜)|Z] is a deterministic function of observable vari-
ables Z while V = Dp(Z, b˜) − lD(Z) is a mean-zero unobserved
stochastic component. Then, we have a latent variable model of
importing:
D∗ = lD(Z) − V , D =
{
0 if D∗ < 0
1 if D∗ ≥ 0. (7)
A plant imports if D∗ ≥ 0; it does not import otherwise. We assume
that the distribution of V, denoted by FV, is continuous and strictly
increasing and, furthermore, that (U0,U1,V) is statistically indepen-
dent of Z given X and v.7
Let P(Z) denote the probability of importing conditional on Z so
that P(Z) ≡ Prob(lD(Z)>V) = FV(lD(Z)). P(Z) is called the propensity
score. Deﬁne UD ≡ FV(V), and the random variable UD is uniformly
distributed on [0, 1] by construction. Because V is the unobserved
component of the net beneﬁt of importing, UD represents the quan-
tiles of the unobserved net beneﬁt from importing. Then the import
decision (7) is alternatively written as D = 1 if P(Z) ≥ UD and D = 0
otherwise.
We deﬁne the marginal treatment effect (MTE) as
DMTE(x,p)=E[S1−S0|X=x,UD = p]= b¯(x)+E[U1−U0|X = x,UD = p].
(8)
This is the average effect of importing on skilled demand for plants
with X = x and UD = p. Because a plant is indifferent between
importing and not importing when P(Z) = UD, the MTE captures
the mean impact from importing on the demand for skilled labor
among plants with X = x and P(Z) = p when the realization of UD
is such that the plant is just indifferent between importing and not
importing.
Estimating theMTE for each value ofUD = pwithin the support of
P(Z), we are able to construct the empirical counterpart to the locus
of returns as outlined in Fig. 1 (c). Compared to Fig. 1 (a) or (b), the
x-axis is measured in import probabilities rather than productivity
in Fig. 1 (c) since we allow ﬁrms to differ in many dimensions rather
than only productivity. Propensity scores are a natural metric to
summarize those observed differences in a single dimension. When
ﬁrms self-select into importing based on their unobserved beneﬁts
from importing, we expect the MTE curve to be downward sloping
because, if ﬁrms choose to import even if their observed character-
istics suggest that they were not likely to import (i.e., the low value
of P(Z) = p), the unobserved component of net beneﬁt from import-
ing must be high (i.e., the high value of E[U1 − U0|X = x,UD = p] in
Eq. (8)). In contrast, we expect theMTE curve to be ﬂat in the absence
of self-selection based on the unobserved beneﬁt from importing.
Further, as described by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2007a,
2007b), theMTE also allows us to compute all the conventional treat-
ment parameters, such as the ATE, the TT, and the TUT, as weighted
averages of the MTE, each computed with a different weighting
function. Details for each of these calculations can be found in
Appendix B.
7 The latter is implied by the independence and monotonicity assumptions of
Imbens and Angrist (1994) as shown by Vytlacil (2002).
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3. Data
3.1. Data sources
Our primary source of data is the Indonesian manufacturing
survey between 1995 and 2007, where we mainly use the data
recorded in the census years 1996 and 2006 because, in these two
years, the Indonesian manufacturing survey records the distribu-
tion of academic achievement in two distinct occupation categories
(non-production and production) in each plant. Speciﬁcally, in each
plant we observe the number of workers with primary, secondary
and post-secondary education. We construct relative skill measures
that are directly based on the workers’ education levels for each
occupation category.
The survey covers all manufacturing plants with at least 20
employees.8 In the 2006 data set, 93% of plants are also single-plant
ﬁrms. The data set captures a wide set of plant-level characteris-
tics which we use to study the nature of plant-level heterogeneity.
In particular, the survey records all expenditures on imported inter-
mediate materials. It also includes plant-level input and output vari-
ables, such as total revenues, capital stock, domestic materials, and
other plant-level information including the percentage of sales from
exports, the percentage of ownership held by foreign investors, total
plant-level expenses on research and development (R&D), and total
plant-level expenditures on worker training. Appendix A provides a
detailed description of our variable construction.
To control for regional labor market conditions we augment
the manufacturing survey with the Indonesian household survey.
The Indonesian household survey covers a nationally representative
sample of households and documents key labor force information
including gender, age, location, educational attainment and labor
force experience. We use the household survey to develop a measure
of the skill premium in each location and year. We are unable to use
the manufacturing survey data for this task since it does not provide
a measure of wages by education level.
3.2. Importing and worker education
3.2.1. Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 1 documents plant-level differences in employ-
ment across six education-based (highest attainment) categories:
less than primary school, primary school, junior high school, high
school, college graduates and post-graduate educated workers. The
top panel compares the percentage of plant-level employment across
importing and non-importing plants in 2006. We ﬁnd that importing
plants, on average, hire fewer workers in each educational category
below high school andmoreworkers with high-school diplomas, col-
lege degrees, or post-graduate training. For example, 61% of workers
in importing plants have at least a high school degree, while only
36% of workers in non-importing plants have a high school degree
or better. In columns (8)–(10), “Training/Worker” and “R&D/Worker”
report the average per worker expenditures on training and research
and development (R&D), respectively, in thousands of 1983 Indone-
sian rupiahs while “Non-prod./All workers” reports the percentage of
non-production workers in total employment in each plant. We ﬁnd
that the expenditures on trainingworkers or investing in R&D among
importers is more than double what is spent by non-importers on
average. Likewise, importers tend to have a relatively large number
of non-production workers in their plants.
8 A limitation of this paper is that in low-income countries a large share of ﬁrms
have few employees (see McCaig and Pavcnik (2014, 2015) for examples). However,
these are likely also ﬁrms that do not directly import or export and typically lack a
skilled labor force.
Panel A of Table 1 also compiles similar statistics for export-
ing plants, non-exporting plants, and foreign-owned plants.9 We
observe a number of stark patterns: foreign plants tend to employ
more educated workers than domestic plants while exporting plants
appear skill-intensive when compared to their non-exporting coun-
terparts. Nonetheless, within each group we continue to ﬁnd that
importing plants hire a greater percentage of educated workers. The
last row of Panel A documents the distribution of skilled labor for
plants which did not import in 1996, where the reduction in sample
size is driven by the fact that only a fraction of 2006 ﬁrms exist in
1996. The skill differences across ﬁrmswhich never import and those
which start importing demonstrate very similar patterns to the full
sample even though the sample is much smaller.
Panel B of Table 1 documents the percentage of workers in each
educational category within production or non-production workers.
For productionworkers, importing plants are found to systematically
hire more workers with education levels above high school. While
this remains true for non-production workers, it is much less stark.
Instead, we observe that importing plants tend to hire a substantially
greater share of college-educated non-production workers.
Although importers always appear to be more skill-intensive
on average within each occupation category, the mechanism that
drives the correlation between importing and skill-intensitymay dif-
fer between production and non-production workers. While the use
of imported materials might induce the adoption of new produc-
tion processes which in turn requires hiring more skilled production
workers, importing might require substantial increases in the num-
ber of non-production workers for trade related activities such as
dealing with customs agents or arranging shipments from foreign
countries. Given the potential for differences across occupation cat-
egories, we analyze the impact of importing on the demand for
educated workers within the production occupation separately from
that within the non-production occupation.
Among production workers, many Indonesian plants do not hire
any workers with college or post-graduate training. As a result,
deﬁning a skilled worker as a “college graduate” in our sample of
production workers would eliminate a signiﬁcant number of plants
that are wholly composed of workers without college education. On
the other hand, using a highschool education thresholdwould poten-
tially obscure a key margin on which ﬁrms upgrade employee skill
in response to importing among non-production workers because
the difference in non-production hiring between importers and non-
importers is clearest at college level, as documented in Table 1. For
these reasons, we choose to deﬁne a skilled worker as one with at
least a high school degree for production workers, and as one with at
least a college degree for non-production workers.
3.2.2. Decomposing changes in plant-level skill shares
To better characterize the development of the Indonesian labor
market, we examine the importance of the reallocation of labor from
the production to non-production occupation (a “between” compo-
nent) relative to the education upgrading within each occupation (a
“within” component). Speciﬁcally, we decompose the change in the
overall share of educated workers for each plant as
D
Ls
L
= D
Lps
Lp
× L
p
L︸ ︷︷ ︸
within prod.
+ D
Lns
Ln
× L
n
L︸ ︷︷ ︸
within non-prod.
+
(
Lps
Lp
− L
n
s
Ln
)
× D L
p
L︸ ︷︷ ︸
between
, (9)
where D(Ls/L) = (Ls/(Ls + Lu))06 − (Ls/(Ls + Lu))96 is the
change in the overall share of educated workers between 1996
9 We classify a plant as foreign plantwhen at least 10% of its equity is held by foreign
investors.
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Table 1
Importing and skill intensity 2006, full sample.
Panel A: all workers
Highest degree completed/fraction Training R&D Non-prod. Obs.
No primary Primary Jr. high High College Grad. Worker Worker All worker
All plants
Importers 0.015 0.071 0.302 0.538 0.073 0.0006 70.9 73.8 0.184 5512
(0.075) (0.171) (0.218) (0.237) (0.093) (0.004) (724.4) (1037.1) (0.151)
Non-imp. 0.059 0.275 0.306 0.323 0.036 0.0003 23.2 17.8 0.135 23,952
(0.151) (0.302) (0.248) (0.295) (0.078) (0.005) (570.0) (294.4) (0.163)
Exporting plants
Importers 0.007 0.069 0.222 0.609 0.091 0.0011 150.7 158.2 0.184 1519
(0.044) (0.124) (0.208) (0.235) (0.103) (0.0065) (1310.4) (1826.3) (0.159)
Non-imp. 0.030 0.190 0.293 0.437 0.050 0.0003 65.0 46.5 0.150 3690
(0.102) (0.239) (0.227) (0.292) (0.075) (0.0034) (1141.0) (613.4) (0.160)
Non-exporting plants
Importers 0.018 0.072 0.333 0.511 0.066 0.0004 40.6 41.6 0.184 3993
(0.084) (0.186) (0.214) (0.232) (0.088) (0.0031) (260.8) (461.2) (0.148)
Non-imp. 0.065 0.291 0.309 0.302 0.033 0.0002 15.6 12.6 0.132 20,262
(0.158) (0.309) (0.252) (0.291) (0.078) (0.0056) (383.0) (183.9) (0.163)
Foreign-owned plants
Importers 0.008 0.070 0.170 0.651 0.099 0.0015 176.4 360.0 0.196 303
(0.045) (0.111) (0.183) (0.238) (0.108) (0.0054) (744.1) (3726.2) (0.177)
Non-imp. 0.023 0.130 0.208 0.555 0.083 0.0007 59.9 111.5 0.178 376
(0.086) (0.185) (0.205) (0.294) (0.108) (0.0038) (337.6) (843.4) (0.158)
Initial non-importers
Importers 0.038 0.114 0.273 0.503 0.072 0.0008 47.2 59.9 0.191 659
(0.127) (0.193) (0.212) (0.259) (0.088) (0.004) (297.2) (387.5) (0.163)
Non-imp. 0.050 0.224 0.325 0.365 0.036 0.0002 16.6 14.7 0.154 7465
(0.134) (0.280) (0.244) (0.283) (0.064) (0.003) (241.9) (212.7) (0.159)
Panel B: production vs. non-production workers
Production workers Non-production workers
No primary Primary Jr. high High College+ No primary Primary Jr. high High College+
All plants
Importers 0.016 0.078 0.328 0.544 0.035 0.002 0.018 0.168 0.566 0.245
(0.077) (0.182) (0.234) (0.264) (0.071) (0.037) (0.092) (0.204) (0.236) (0.232)
Non-imp. 0.061 0.290 0.324 0.309 0.017 0.017 0.085 0.193 0.534 0.172
(0.156) (0.314) (0.267) (0.315) (0.065) (0.107) (0.232) (0.288) (0.352) (0.257)
Exporting plants
Importers 0.008 0.081 0.240 0.627 0.044 0.003 0.024 0.104 0.529 0.340
(0.046) (0.144) (0.225) (0.266) (0.084) (0.026) (0.086) (0.157) (0.254) (0.271)
Non-imp. 0.030 0.206 0.314 0.429 0.021 0.013 0.053 0.133 0.543 0.258
(0.104) (0.256) (0.247) (0.320) (0.060) (0.091) (0.166) (0.223) (0.322) (0.292)
Non-exporting plants
Importers 0.018 0.077 0.361 0.513 0.031 0.002 0.016 0.194 0.581 0.207
(0.086) (0.195) (0.229) (0.256) (0.066) (0.040) (0.094) (0.215) (0.227) (0.203)
Non-imp. 0.067 0.305 0.326 0.287 0.016 0.018 0.091 0.206 0.532 0.154
(0.163) (0.322) (0.270) (0.309) (0.066) (0.110) (0.244) (0.298) (0.358) (0.245)
Foreign-owned plants
Importers 0.009 0.084 0.181 0.686 0.041 0.004 0.023 0.074 0.498 0.401
(0.044) (0.134) (0.200) (0.269) (0.085) (0.039) (0.075) (0.136) (0.276) (0.299)
Non-imp. 0.023 0.145 0.229 0.564 0.038 0.012 0.034 0.102 0.506 0.346
(0.085) (0.208) (0.227) (0.336) (0.100) (0.081) (0.116) (0.198) (0.334) (0.330)
Initial non-importers
Importers 0.039 0.126 0.297 0.507 0.031 0.010 0.035 0.166 0.540 0.250
(0.129) (0.207) (0.227) (0.286) (0.064) (0.088) (0.131) (0.226) (0.258) (0.235)
Non-imp. 0.052 0.243 0.348 0.343 0.014 0.011 0.056 0.201 0.570 0.162
(0.141) (0.298) (0.264) (0.305) (0.047) (0.082) (0.181) (0.277) (0.320) (0.229)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The ﬁrst column indicates current import status, where “importers” denotes plants that import and “non-importers” captures
plants that do not import in the current year. The ﬁrst panel pools all plants in all years. The second and third panel split the sample by export status, while the fourth and ﬁfth
panels split the sample by the country of ownership. Speciﬁcally, foreign-owned plants are deﬁned as those plants where at least 10% of equity is held by foreign investors while
domestic plants are deﬁned as plants for which more than 90% of equity is held by domestic investors.
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and 2006, D
(
Ljs/Lj
)
=
(
Ljs/(L
j
s + L
j
u)
)
06
−
(
Ljs/(L
j
s + L
j
u)
)
96
is
the change in the share of educated workers within occupa-
tion j, D(Lp/L) = (Lp/(Lp + Ln))06 − (Lp/(Lp + Ln))96 is the
change in the share of workers in the production occupa-
tion, and (L j/L) =
{(
Lj/(Lp + Ln)
)
96
+
(
Lj/(Lp + Ln)
)
06
}
/2 and(
Ljs/(L j
)
=
{(
Ljs/(L
j
s + L
j
u)
)
96
+
(
Ljs/(L
j
s + L
j
u)
)
06
}
/2 are the aver-
age of the corresponding share variables. The superscripts “p” and
“n” represent production and non-production occupations, while the
subscript “s” and “u” represent skilled and unskilled workers, respec-
tively. Likewise, the subscripts “96” and “06” indicate whether a
variable is measured in 1996 or 2006.
Table 2 reports the average value of each of the three decom-
position components across plants. In the second column, deﬁning
educated workers as those workers with a highschool diploma, the
overall share of educated workers increased by 14.5 percentage
points from 0.322 to 0.467 between 1996 and 2006, and this increase
is mostly explained by the skill upgrading within occupations.10 In
fact, skill upgrading within production workers and non-production
workers, respectively account for 86% and 10% of the overall change
in the share of skilled workers while the reallocation of workers
from the production to non-production occupation contributes less
than 5%. The third and fourth columns compare the plants that
never imported (“non-switchers”) with those that started importing
(“switchers”) and show that skill upgrading is higher at all margins
for switchers except within non-production workers. The overall dif-
ferences in skill share growth between switchers and non-switchers
is largely driven by the differences in skill share growth within
production workers.
The fourth to sixth columns repeat the same decomposition exer-
cise, but deﬁne skilled workers as those workers with an educational
attainment of no less than college. In the ﬁfth column, the over-
all share of college educated workers increased by 1.75 percentage
points from 0.325 to 0.500 between 1996 and 2006, and the “within
non-production” term in the decomposition accounts for more than
60% of the change in the share of college educated workers. We
similarly ﬁnd that the differences in skill share growth within non-
production workers is largest determinant of the difference between
the collegeworker share growth across switchers and non-switchers.
3.3. Variable deﬁnitions
All outcome variables and most explanatory variables are mea-
sured in 2006. The lagged value of outcome variables is also included
in the set of explanatory variables so that our sample consists of
plants that are present in both the 1996 and 2006 data sets. The def-
initions of variables and their descriptive statistics are reported in
Tables 3 and 4.
We consider eight different outcome variables. Our ﬁrst twomea-
sures, ln
(
Lps /L
p
u
)
06
and ln (Lns /L
n
u)06, directly capture the number of
skilled workers within each occupation category in 2006, where
Ljs and L
j
u are the number of skilled workers and unskilled work-
ers, respectively, employed in occupation j ∈ {p,n}. We deﬁne
a skilled production worker as one with at least a highschool
diploma and a skilled non-production worker as one with a col-
lege degree. A non-trivial number of plants that do not hire
10 Table G.5 in Appendix reports details. Appealing to census data, we also ﬁnd that
there is similar growth in the supply of skilled (highschool or college) manufacturing
workers.
any skilled workers are dropped from our sample when we use
the log of the ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers as
an outcome variable. Because this omission may generate selec-
tion bias, we also consider the outcome variables that mea-
sure the fraction of skilled workers’ in each occupation category,
denoted by
(
Lps /
(
Lps + L
p
u
))
06
and (Lns /(L
n
s + L
n
u))06. To examine the
total relative demand for educated workers, the ﬁfth and sixth
outcome variables aggregate skilled workers across occupations
where ln (Ls/Lu)06 ≡ ln
(
Lns + L
p
s /Lnu + L
p
u
)
06
and (Ls/(Ls + Lu))06 ≡((
Lps + Lns
)
/
(
Lps + L
p
u + Lns + L
n
u
))
06
. We keep the deﬁnition of skill,
a highschool diploma or college degree, consistent across occu-
pations in these measures and present both results in all of our
regressions. Finally, our last outcome variable considers the log ratio
of non-production workers to production workers, ln (Ln/Lp))06 ≡
ln
(
(Lns + L
n
u) /
(
Lps + L
p
u
))
06
, or the fraction of non-production work-
ers, (Ln/(Ln + Lp))06 ≡
(
(Lnu + L
n
s ) /
(
Lps + L
p
u + Lns + L
n
u
))
06
, which
are often used as measures of skill intensity in the existing literature.
The set of explanatory variables, X, includes the lagged value of
the outcome variable in 1996, denoted by using the subscript “96”
in place of “06,” dummy variables for plants that did not hire any
skilled or unskilled workers in each occupation in 1996, denoted by
d js,96 and d
j
u,96 for j = p,n, and the relative wage ratios in 1996,
denoted by ln(Ws/Wu)96.11 In addition, X contains the plant’s cur-
rent export status, our estimate of Hicks-neutral productivity v, the
plant’s capital stock, the local skilled-unskilled wage ratio,12 a large
set of dummy variables to capture differences across foreign own-
ership, R&D expenditures, worker training expenditures, industries
and provinces. Using production function (1), we estimate a model-
consistent measure of Hicks-neutral productivity v based on the
frameworks developed by Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003), Ackerberg et al. (2015) and Gandhi et al. (2013) as
described in Appendix C. For robustness, we also estimated a con-
ventional measure of TFP from a standard Cobb–Douglas production
function and used this in place of our Hicks-neutral productivity
measure.
3.4. Instruments
We expect that the decision to import for any given plant is likely
to be endogenously determinedwith its decision to hire skilled labor.
The identiﬁcation strategy we outline below relies on the presence of
instruments. Our primary instrument set includes location-speciﬁc
transport costs and industry-speciﬁc measures of the fraction of
imports shipped by air. We also consider industry-speciﬁc measures
of imported input weight, changes in product-speciﬁc input and out-
put tariffs, and tariff-based measures of export market access to
check our benchmark results or control for the potential endogene-
ity of plant export behavior. We discuss the construction of each
instrument in turn.
Since we do not observe transport costs to the port directly, we
construct the measure of transport cost for each plant as follows.
To incorporate geographical information, we ﬁrst divide Indonesia
11 We include an explanatory variable that equals zero if either ds,96 = 0 or du,96 = 0
and equals ln
(
Lps /L
p
u
)
otherwise. For notational brevity, we indicate this variable by
ln
(
Lps /L
p
u
)
96
.
12 The wage ratio is measured through a series of Mincer regressions described in
Appendix A. We proceed in this fashion so to isolate the local difference in wages due
to education alone, rather than have differences in the wage ratio reﬂect differences
in demographics, experience, etc across regions.
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Table 2
A decomposition of plant-level skill growth by import status.
Def. of skilled workers Highschool+ College+
Initial non-importers Initial non-importers
Sample All Switchers Non-switchers All Switchers Non-switchers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(Ls/L) 0.1446 0.1636 0.1425 0.0175 0.0270 0.0144
Within prod. 0.1248 0.1409 0.1235 0.0058 0.0067 0.0048
Within non-prod. 0.0137 0.0113 0.0128 0.0106 0.0147 0.0085
Between 0.0060 0.0114 0.0062 0.0011 0.0056 0.0011
No. of obs. 10,537 658 7464 10,537 658 7,464
a. Source: Indonesia Manufacturing Survey in 1996 and 2006.
b. Skilled workers are deﬁned as workers with education no less than highschool in the second to fourth columns and workers with no less than college in the ﬁfth to last columns.
Plants with no production workers in 1996 or 2006 are excluded (only three observations). Plants with no non-production worker in either period are treated as having zero
within-non-production changes, and the mean value of skill share in non-production sector ¯(Lns /Ln) is computed using the period when the number of non-production workers is
positive. Plants with no non-production workers in both 1990 and 2006 simply have a zero within non-production component and zero between component.
into cells of one kilometer squared and assign a value of 1–10 to
each cell, where “10” is the highest cost (Steepness of Slope, Sea vs.
Land). Then, we use ArcGIS to ﬁnd the least accumulative-cost path
between any plant and its nearest port. Finally, our measure of trans-
port cost is obtained from the least accumulative-cost after dividing
it by the sample standard deviation.
For the fraction of imports shipped by air, we rely on research
that suggests that differences in trade responses across industries
can arise from differences in the nature of delivery (e.g. air vs.
water) or heaviness of the output. We extend this literature by
combining measures the fraction of imports shipped by air (or of
the weight of imports to Indonesia), industry-by-industry, with an
Indonesian import input–output table to construct an industry-level
Table 3
Deﬁnitions of the variables.
Var. Deﬁnition
S (1) The log of the ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers in 2006 in
occupation j ∈ {p,n}, ln
(
Ljs/L
j
u
)
06
, across both occupations, ln(Ls/Lu)06, or
the log of the ratio of non-production workers to production workers in
2006, ln(Ln/Lp)06. (2) The fraction of skilled workers in 2006 in
occupation j ∈ {p,n},
(
Ljs/(L
j
s + L
j
u)
)
06
, across both occupations
(highschool or college), ln(Ls/Lu)06, and the fraction of non-production
workers in 2006, (Ln/(Ln + Lp))06.
D Equal to one if plant imports materials from abroad in 2006; zero
otherwise.
X Export dummy, capital stock, Hicks-neutral productivity, a foreign
ownership dummy, a dummy for positive R&D expenditures, a dummy
for positive training expenditures, the log of the ratio of skilled workers’
wages to unskilled workers’ wages in 1996 and in 2006 in each region,
local changes in the supply of skilled labor, the 1996 value of the
outcome variables (denoted by replacing “06” with “96”), a dummy for
no hiring of skilled workers or unskilled workers in occupation j ∈ {p,n}
in 1996 denoted by d js,96 := 1(L
j
s = 0) or d
j
u,96 := 1(L
j
u = 0), TFP
constructed by the Levinsohn and Petrin method, 3-digit ISIC industry
dummies, and province dummies.
Z\X Transport costs to the nearest port, the fraction of Indonesian imports
shipped by air in industry j, the average weight of Indonesian imports in
industry j, a change in output and input tariff rates at 5-digit ISIC level
between 1996 and 2001.
Notes: A skilled worker is deﬁned as a worker with high school eduction and an
unskilled worker is deﬁned as a worker without high school education. Occupa-
tion categories “p” and “n” denote production workers and non-production workers,
respectively. All variables are measured in 2006 unless stated otherwise.
measure of the share of imports shipped by air.13 The intuition for
the transport mode instrument (air vs. water) comes directly from
Hummels and Schaur (2013) which argues that exporters pay a pre-
mium to ship goods by air for faster delivery. Similarly, as Cos¸ar
and Demir (2015) recognize, heavier imports will be more costly to
ship.
For each industry j, the variables airsharej and weightj measure
the fraction of Indonesian imports shipped by air and the weight of
Indonesian imports,
airsharej =
air valuej
air valuej + ocean valuej
, and,
weightj = ln
(
ocean weightj
ocean valuej
)
,
where air valuej denotes the value of air shipments to Indonesia
in 2006 and ocean valuej (ocean weightj) denotes the value (weight)
of shipments to Indonesia by ocean in the same year.14 We then
combine this information with an import input–output table which
provides us with the share of imports purchased from each industry
in Indonesia.15 Letting shareij represent industry i′s import expendi-
ture share on from industry j, our measures of import air share and
import weight in industry i are constructed as
Import airsharei =
∑
j
shareij × airsharej,
Import weighti =
∑
j
shareij × weightj,
where
∑
j shareij = 1 ∀ i by construction. Not surprisingly, these
two instruments are highly correlated. Because of this we largely
focus on the variable capturing the fraction of imports shipped by air
since the import weight variable adds little statistically signiﬁcant
variation to our ﬁrst stage regressions.
13 The import input–output table is produced by BPS Indonesia.
14 Speciﬁcally, we compute these measures for shipments to Indonesia from the US
and Europe. We then take a simple average across both import sources. We thank
Kerem Cos¸ar who provided us with his Stata do ﬁles that compute variables weightj
and airsharej from EU and US trade data sets.
15 BPS Indonesia produces detailed input–output tablesmeasuring of total purchases
(all sources) at the industry-level or total domestic purchases. We construct mea-
sures import ﬂows and import shares by subtracting the information in the domestic
input–output table from the comparable information in the total input–output table.
All input–output data is measured in 1995.
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics.
D = 0 D = 1 D = 0 D = 1
Explanatory variablea Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Explanatory variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
TC 0.874 0.924 0.631 0.814 log(Ws/Wu)
high
06 0.435 0.187 0.449 0.152
Air 0.087 0.068 0.114 0.090 log(Ws/Wu)coll06 0.571 0.271 0.555 0.218
Export 0.175 0.380 0.434 0.497 log(Ws/Wu)
high
96 0.472 0.146 0.459 0.140
Capital 13.570 1.808 15.086 2.034 log(Ws/Wu)coll06 0.580 0.243 0.586 0.264
Hicks-neutral v 5.229 0.582 5.538 0.636 ln(Lps /L
p
u)
high
96 −0.735 1.359 −0.389 1.502
Foreign 0.017 0.130 0.081 0.273 ln(Lns /L
n
u)
coll
96 −0.622 1.095 −0.930 1.173
R&D 0.057 0.231 0.178 0.384 (Lps /(L
p
s + L
p
u))
high
96 0.212 0.266 0.386 0.325
Training 0.308 0.462 0.589 0.493 (Lps /(L
p
s + L
p
u))coll96 0.008 0.039 0.026 0.079
dp,highu,96 0.017 0.128 0.057 0.233 d
n,coll
u,96 0.115 0.319 0.044 0.205
dp,highs,96 0.342 0.475 0.152 0.359 d
n,coll
s,96 0.607 0.489 0.323 0.469
No. of obs. 5706 4410
D = 0 D = 1 D = 0 D = 1
Outcome variableb Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Outcome variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
ln (Lps /L
p
u)06 −0.553 1.657 0.490 1.676 (Lps /(Lps + Lpu))06 0.340 0.333 0.559 0.337
ln (Lps /L
p
u)06 −1.202 1.202 −0.853 1.261 (Lps /(Lps + Lpu))06 0.166 0.253 0.278 0.266
ln(Ls/Lu)
high
06 −0.577 1.683 0.645 1.722 (Ls/(Ls + Lu))high06 0.399 0.315 0.604 0.312
ln(Ls/Lu)coll06 −3.050 1.090 −2.665 1.166 (Ls/(Ls + Lu))coll06 0.037 0.066 0.081 0.096
ln(Ln/Lp)06 −1.791 1.082 −1.639 1.093 (Ln/(Ln + Lp))06 0.184 0.156 0.208 0.156
Notes:
a The sample statistics for the explanatory variables that are used to estimate the decisions to import in Table G.8.
b The sample statistics for the outcome variables that are used to estimate the skill demand Eq. (11). The superscript “high” and “coll” denote variables that are measured using
highschool or college as the skill threshold, respectively.
For the fourth and ﬁfth instruments, we match each plant in
our manufacturing survey to product-level (5-digit ISIC) output and
input tariffs constructed by Amiti and Konings (2007) and use the
change in output and input tariff rates between 1996 and 2001 as
our instrument. The sixth instrument is a tariff-based measure of
market access for Indonesian exporters in destination markets. For
each industry and year, we calculate the average tariff faced by ﬁrms
in export markets where export shares are used as weights. We then
compute the change in export market access for each Indonesian
industry. Full details of the construction of all instruments can be
found in Appendix A.
Naturally, we are concerned that the empirical estimates we ﬁnd
may be biased if the instruments we use are not exogenous. For the
transport cost variable, it is possible that plants with a high-return
from importing will choose to locate closer to ports. To address the
potential concern for endogenous location choice, we focus on the
sample of plants which initially did not import in 1996. In this fash-
ion, we can consider the impact of transport costs (and tariffs) on
plantswhomade their location decisionwell before they began using
imported materials. Likewise, we use the 1996 industry aﬃliation
when assigning the import airshare to each plant. In this fashion,
we guard against bias that would arise from plants which strategi-
cally switch to new industries in response to changes in the trade
environment.16
4. Results
4.1. Benchmark IV ﬁndings
Table 5 presents the results from estimating Eq. (5) by OLS and IV
for production and non-production workers separately. Consistent
16 When using import weight or the tariff instruments we also match plants accord-
ing to their 1996 industry aﬃliation.
with the model presented in Section 2, columns (1), (2), (5) and
(6) use the log of the ratio of skilled production to unskilled pro-
duction workers as its dependent variable. Unfortunately, because
numerous plants have not hired even one skilled worker, using the
log skill ratio leads to a non-trivial loss of plants. To address this
potential source of bias, we repeat our exercise using the fraction of
skilled workers in the plant’s workforce as the dependent variable
in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8). In all cases we restrict attention to
the set of plant’s which were not importing in 1996 so to isolate the
impact of importing on plants whomade their location decisions and
determined their main product before they began using imported
materials.17
Columns (1)–(4) present results for production workers where
a skilled production worker is deﬁned as one who has successfully
completed highschool. The OLS point estimate in column (1) suggests
that importing signiﬁcantly increases the relative demand for skilled
workers within the production occupation by 48 log basis points.
Similarly, column (3) indicates that importing increases the skilled
fraction of the plant’s workforce by 5.5 percentage points. While
these effects seem widely different at ﬁrst blush, they are roughly
consistent with each other since the fraction of skilled employees
hired by initial non-importers prior to importing is typically quite
small.
Columns (2) and (4), which instrument import status using both
the distance to a major Indonesian port and fraction of imports
shipped by air, suggest substantially larger effects. In fact, our ﬁnd-
ings suggest that importing increases the relative demand for skilled
production workers by 371 log basis points and similarly increases
17 Capital, R&D, and training variables could be endogenously determined. When we
drop capital, R&D, and training variables from the set of regressors in Table 5, the
results are very similar. See Table G.6 in the Appendix.
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Table 5
Skill demand equation across occupations.
Occupation threshold Production highschool Non-production college
Dependent variable ln(Lps /L
p
u)
(
Lps
Lps+L
p
u
)
ln(Lns /L
n
u)
(
Lns
Lns +L
n
u
)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Import status 0.479∗∗∗ 3.705∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 3.643∗∗∗ 0.023 0.698∗∗∗
[0.108] [1.320] [0.017] [0.280] [0.094] [1.130] [0.015] [0.238]
Export status −0.043 −0.263∗∗ 0.018 −0.053∗ −0.174∗∗ −0.486∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.034
[0.074] [0.127] [0.013] [0.028] [0.076] [0.143] [0.012] [0.023]
Wagej06 −0.101 −0.161 −0.010 −0.015 −0.064 −0.195 −0.030∗ −0.026
[0.164] [0.191] [0.023] [0.029] [0.120] [0.148] [0.016] [0.019]
Capital 0.124∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ −0.015 −0.080∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.004
[0.018] [0.029] [0.003] [0.005] [0.017] [0.031] [0.003] [0.005]
Hicks-neutral, v −0.259∗∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.021∗ 0.020 −0.054 0.030∗∗∗ 0.020∗
[0.049] [0.061] [0.008] [0.011] [0.049] [0.061] [0.008] [0.010]
Foreign-owned 0.068 −0.243 0.007 −0.105∗ 0.124 −0.312 0.015 −0.067
[0.150] [0.250] [0.030] [0.057] [0.146] [0.264] [0.028] [0.048]
R&D 0.025 −0.169 0.029∗ −0.014 0.072 −0.148 0.024 −0.010
[0.102] [0.151] [0.017] [0.030] [0.094] [0.151] [0.016] [0.025]
Training 0.212∗∗∗ 0.124 0.048∗∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.020 −0.086 0.045∗∗∗ 0.025∗
[0.061] [0.079] [0.010] [0.015] [0.058] [0.081] [0.009] [0.013]
Wage j96 −0.543∗∗∗ −0.657∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗ 0.165 0.030∗ 0.013
[0.190] [0.226] [0.030] [0.040] [0.133] [0.181] [0.018] [0.023]
ln (Ljs/L
j
u)96 0.362∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
[0.023] [0.029] [0.031] [0.043]
d ju 0.282 0.033 −0.025 −0.036
[0.201] [0.264] [0.124] [0.149]
d js −0.993∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.444∗∗∗ −0.315∗∗∗
[0.074] [0.085] [0.076] [0.100](
Ljs
Ljs+L
j
u
)
96
0.439∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
[0.020] [0.031] [0.026] [0.031]
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.343 – 0.395 – 0.169 – 0.143 –
Hansen Jp-value – 0.153 – 0.141 – 0.336 – 0.185
No. of obs. 3139 3111 4445 4410 2108 2089 4021 3988
Notes: Robust standard errors are in square brackets. The sample of initial non-importers is used in all regressions. The education threshold used to determine a skilled production
worker is a highschool diploma, while the threshold used for a skilled non-production worker is a college degree. Import status is treated as an endogenous variable in columns
(2), (4), (6) and (8). It is instrumented with both the distance to port and the share of imports shipped by air.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗ p < 0.1.
the skilled fraction of the plant’s labor force by 99 percentage points.
Given the large magnitude of these estimates, it would be natural
for the reader to be concerned that our point estimates suffer from
the presence of weak instruments. However, as documented in Table
G.8 of the Appendix, the ﬁrst stage results suggest that our instru-
ments are suﬃciently strong (individually and jointly) to conﬁdently
estimate the causal impact of importing on the demand for skill.
Furthermore, the p-values of Hansen’s J test support the validity
of the overidentiﬁcation restrictions, providing some evidence that
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.
In a “standard” setting where we assume that there is no hetero-
geneity in b across plants in Eq. (5), the ﬁnding that the IV estimate is
much larger than the OLS estimate could be viewed as puzzling since
the OLS bias may likely be upward in this case. When the coeﬃcient
b is random, however, ﬁnding a large IV estimate is less puzzling
because the IV estimator identiﬁes the local average treatment effect
in the sense that it only captures the impact of importing on plants
that change their import status in response to variation in the instru-
mental variable. Our results suggest that, on average, only those
plants with very high values of b — interpreted as plants with a bet-
ter ability to adopt skill biased technology—choose to change their
import status. One possible explanation is that starting to import is
very costly: when the start-up cost of importing is large, only those
plants which receive suﬃciently large beneﬁts from changing their
import status (represented by high values of b) will choose to start
importing. Moreover, it is important to recall the context of this
estimate. In our sample, as reported in Table 4, the ratio of skilled
to unskilled workers among importers is nearly double that of the
average non-importer.
Columns (5)–(8) consider the same experiment for non-
productionworkers.We again ﬁnd that the IV estimates indicate that
importing consistently has a large, positive and statistically signiﬁ-
cant impact on the demand skilledworkers. It important to recognize
that our deﬁnition of ‘skill’ has changed in this experiment; we now
deﬁne a skilled worker as one with a college degree. Our ﬁndings
suggest an important change in the organization of non-production
activities, although non-production workers represent a relatively
small fraction of the workforce as documented is Section 3.18 In fact,
the IV estimates imply a 364 log basis point increase in demand
18 Our ﬁndings are strongest using the skill thresholds documented in Table 5. How-
ever, we continue to ﬁnd marginally signiﬁcant effects if we use alternative skill
thresholds in each case. See the Appendix for details.
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skilled non-production workers and a 70 percentage point increase
in the fraction of skilled non-production workers.
The control variables in Table 5 generally report consistent
and intuitive coeﬃcients. The estimated coeﬃcients on plant-level
export status are often negative, which reﬂects the fact that Indone-
sia has a comparative advantage in unskilled-labor intensive goods.
The signiﬁcant positive capital and training coeﬃcients indicate both
capital and training are complementary to hiring skilled labor. On the
other hand, foreign ownership is often negatively associatedwith the
demand for skilled labor, suggesting that foreign ownership is a sub-
stitute for skill-intensive production processes (e.g. by offshoring the
skill-intensive portion of production abroad). The estimated coeﬃ-
cient on Hicks-neutral productivity v is negative, which suggests a
trade-off between the adoption of skill-biased technology and the
adoption of technology that is unbiased across skill differences. The
coeﬃcient on relative wages in 2006 is negative, as expected, but
insigniﬁcant.19 The estimated coeﬃcient on the lagged value of the
outcome variable is positive, statistically signiﬁcant, and consistently
estimated to lie between 0 and 1. This may reﬂect either the per-
sistence of unobserved characteristics that affect the plant’s demand
for skilled labor or the presence of adjustment costs associated with
changing the plant’s skill ratio.
Table 6 considers the plant-level demand for skill across all work-
ers in a plant. Speciﬁcally, columns (1)–(4) consider the impact of
importing on the relative demand for workers with at least a high-
school diploma and columns (5)–(8) similarly examine the impact
of importing on the relative demand for workers with a college
degree. We also consider speciﬁcations where we use the log ratio of
non-production to production workers or the fraction of the work-
force engaged in non-production activities as a dependent variable in
columns (9)–(12). These last exercises allow us to compare whether
existing, common measures of skill-intensity, namely the fraction
non-production workers in a plant, provide meaningfully different
results from education-based measures of skill.20
The ﬁrst two exercises in Table 6 present results which are simi-
lar to those in Table 5. In particular, the results from the regressions
using highschool as the skill threshold closely resemble the results
for production workers, while the results from the regressions which
deﬁne college as the skill threshold are similar to our results which
examine non-production workers alone. As above, in all cases we
ﬁnd that importing has a large, positive and highly signiﬁcant impact
on the demand for skilled labor. In comparison, the estimated coeﬃ-
cients on non-production intensity are positive in columns (9)–(12)
but onlymarginally signiﬁcant in one of four columns. The results are
broadly consistent with our decomposition analysis and suggest that
importing is mainly inducing skill-upgradingwithin each occupation
group while the skill upgrading through reallocation from produc-
tionworkers to non-productionworkers plays, at best, the secondary
role.
On the surface, our results might appear inconsistent with the
result from Amiti and Cameron (2012, pages 285–286) which “shows
that relative education intensity of production workers relative to
nonproduction workers actually declined between 1996 and 2006
in importing and exporting ﬁrms relative to domestically-oriented
ﬁrms.” However, it is important to distinguish key differences
across these empirical exercises. Speciﬁcally, Amiti and Cameron
19 In each case, the relative wage variable, the lagged dependent variable, and the
lagged indicator variables are deﬁned consistently with the skill threshold used in
each regression. For instance, in columns (1)–(4) it is the relative differences between
workers with a highschool degree and those without, while in columns (5)–(8) it mea-
sures the wage differences will college educated workers and those without a college
degree. Details on the construction of these variables can be found in the Appendix.
20 See Bernard and Jensen (1997), Harrison and Hanson (1999), Pavcnik (2003),
and Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) for examples of papers which use the ratio of
non-production to production workers as a measure of skill.
study the correlation of past import status with the relative growth
of education-intensity across occupations, we focus on impact of
starting to import on within-plant or within-plant-and-occupation
skill upgrading.21
Tables 7 and 8 report a number of robustness checks for our
benchmark results. We ﬁrst estimate our speciﬁcation in ﬁrst differ-
ences by the IV regression. The differenced speciﬁcation inherently
controls for any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in Eq. (5)
at the plant-level. Moreover, including both industry and region
dummies allows us to condition our results on any differential trends
across regions or industry. Last, in columns (2), (4), (6), (8) and (10),
we drop changes in city-level relative wages as a control variable and
instead directly control for the change in relative supply of skilled to
unskilled labor in each location.22
Table 7 reports point estimates that are consistently large and
positive regardless of whether we control for changes in relative
wages or the relative supply of skilled labor. Within occupations,
we continue to ﬁnd that importing has a highly signiﬁcant impact
on the relative demand for skill among production workers, but less
so among non-production workers. Examining all workers together,
we again ﬁnd strongly signiﬁcant results when we use either skill
threshold and marginally signiﬁcant point estimates when we con-
sider the fraction of non-production workers. Across all cases, we
recover substantially smaller point estimates in the ﬁrst differenced
speciﬁcation relative to the benchmark results.23
Table 8 presents a series of further robustness checks. Although
we only report key coeﬃcients in Table 8, a full set of controls are
included in each regression. The top panel (regressions (1)–(10))
reconsiders our benchmark framework but uses our alternativemea-
sure of the relative supply of skilled labor in each location in place
of the skill premium. Importing continues to have a large, positive
impact on the demand for skill, while the coeﬃcients on the relative
supply of skilled labor are positive.
The second panel (regressions (11)–(20)) includes our additional
instruments for the decision to import; speciﬁcally, we augment our
benchmark instrument set with the weight of imported goods and
the tariffs faced by importers on intermediate inputs. In each case we
observe a coeﬃcient which is similar is size and magnitude to our
benchmark IV ﬁndings in Tables 5 and 6.
The third panel (regressions (21)–(30)) includes both a measure
of the plant-level intensity of importing, the fraction of total interme-
diates imported from abroad, along with the import status dummy
variable. By including both import status and import intensity we
investigate the degree to which the impact of importing on plant-
level skill composition ismanifested through changes in the intensive
or extensive import margins. The import status coeﬃcient is always
positive and nearly always statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast, import
intensity is consistently estimated tonegative and is never signiﬁcant.
21 Table F4 in the Appendix replicates column 2 of Table 8 in Amiti and Cameron
(2012) to the best of our ability. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between
changes in relative education intensity and plant-level importing dynamics. Using the
change in import status between 1996 and 2006 in place of the 1996 import status in
their speciﬁcation leads to a result where the change in the relative education inten-
sity is positively correlated with the change in import status between 1996 and 2006.
One possible interpretation of this positive correlation between the change in rela-
tive education intensity and the change in import status in column (7) is that starting
to import induces more education-upgrading within production workers than within
non-production workers.
22 Regional supply of skilled and unskilled workers are simple counts of working age
population with educational attainment above and below the skill threshold (high-
school or college). Across all columns we focus on the skilled fraction of the plant’s
workforce because there aremany plants that did not hire any skilledworkers in 1996,
which forces us to drop more plants from our sample in the log speciﬁcation.
23 The ﬁrst differenced speciﬁcation could bias the point estimates downwards if the
speciﬁcationwith lagged dependent variable is the correct speciﬁcation. The Appendix
D provides a detailed argument that extends the argument of Angrist and Pischke
(2009, pp. 184–185) in the context of the IV regression.
H
.K
asahara,et
al.
/JournalofInternationalEconom
ics
102
(2016)
242–261
253
Table 6
Skill demand equation for all workers in levels.
Threshold Highschool College Occupation
Dependent
variable
ln(Ls/Lu)
(
Ls
Ls+Lu
)
ln(Ls/Lu)
(
Ls
Ls+Lu
)
ln(Ln/Lp)
(
Ln
Ln+Lp
)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Import status 0.409∗∗∗ 4.503∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗ 0.162∗ 3.313∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.020 1.411∗ 0.007 0.101
[0.099] [1.585] [0.015] [0.258] [0.085] [1.093] [0.005] [0.073] [0.060] [0.755] [0.009] [0.107]
Export status 0.020 −0.293∗ 0.016 −0.052∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗ −0.543∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.023∗∗
[0.067] [0.153] [0.012] [0.026] [0.065] [0.139] [0.003] [0.007] [0.049] [0.083] [0.007] [0.011]
Wage j06 −0.094 −0.157 0.008 0.004 −0.072 −0.177 −0.007∗ −0.008 0.031 0.048 −0.002 −0.001
[0.139] [0.171] [0.021] [0.027] [0.110] [0.144] [0.003] [0.005] [0.102] [0.105] [0.015] [0.014]
Capital 0.116∗∗∗ 0.050 0.021∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.028∗ −0.042 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002 0.027∗∗∗ 0.004 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003
[0.016] [0.033] [0.003] [0.005] [0.016] [0.033] [0.001] [0.001] [0.010] [0.016] [0.001] [0.002]
Hicks-neutral,
v
−0.188∗∗∗ −0.259∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.024∗∗ 0.015 −0.051 0.004∗ 0.000 −0.118∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.007
[0.047] [0.062] [0.007] [0.010] [0.044] [0.058] [0.002] [0.003] [0.031] [0.035] [0.005] [0.005]
Foreign-
owned
0.013 −0.314 0.017 −0.091∗ 0.144 −0.415 0.005 −0.027∗ −0.051 −0.249∗ −0.011 −0.024
[0.152] [0.269] [0.027] [0.054] [0.130] [0.278] [0.009] [0.016] [0.099] [0.147] [0.014] [0.020]
R&D 0.192∗∗ −0.039 0.030∗ −0.012 0.163∗∗ 0.021 0.022∗∗∗ 0.010 0.168∗∗ 0.105 0.025∗∗ 0.022∗
[0.092] [0.163] [0.016] [0.028] [0.077] [0.123] [0.006] [0.009] [0.075] [0.090] [0.012] [0.013]
Training 0.278∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.023 0.114∗∗ −0.004 0.017∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.061 0.021 0.012∗∗ 0.009
[0.055] [0.075] [0.009] [0.014] [0.053] [0.085] [0.002] [0.004] [0.037] [0.047] [0.005] [0.006]
Wage j96 −0.619∗∗∗ −0.769∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.219 0.017∗∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.109 0.034 0.034∗∗ 0.026
[0.172] [0.217] [0.027] [0.038] [0.119] [0.177] [0.004] [0.006] [0.119] [0.125] [0.016] [0.016]
ln(Ls/Lu)96 0.449∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
[0.023] [0.033] [0.026] [0.044]
du −0.074 −0.063 −0.313∗∗ −0.231
[0.047] [0.060] [0.136] [0.187]
ds 0.058 0.022 0.139∗∗ 0.104
[0.061] [0.075] [0.058] [0.081](
Ls
Ls+Lu
)
96
0.484∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
[0.018] [0.029] [0.038] [0.050]
ln(Ln/Lp)96 0.392∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
[0.019] [0.020]
dp −0.119∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗
[0.035] [0.037]
dn 0.094∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗
[0.032] [0.035](
Ln
Ln+Lp
)
96
−0.119∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗
[0.035] [0.037]
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.395 – 0.440 – 0.340 – 0.247 – 0.251 – 0.237 –
Hansen
Jp-value
– 0.234 – 0.202 – 0.782 – 0.284 – 0.360 – 0.874
No. of obs. 3434 3405 4445 4410 1657 1641 4445 4410 4,021 3,988 4445 4410
Notes: Robust standard errors are in square brackets. The sample of initial non-importers is used in all regressions. Import status is treated as an endogenous variable in columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) and (12). It is instrumented with
both the distance to port and the share of imports shipped by air.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 7
Robustness checks: the skill demand equation in differences.
Occupation threshold Production highschool Non-production college All highschool All college All occupation
Dep. var. D
(
Lps
Lps+L
p
u
)
D
(
Lns
Lns +L
n
u
)
D
(
Ls
Ls+Lu
)
D
(
Ls
Ls+Lu
)
D
(
Ln
Ln+Lp
)
IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
D Import status 0.779∗∗ 0.801∗∗ 0.255 0.251 0.540∗∗ 0.541∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.259∗ 0.261∗
[0.318] [0.325] [0.217] [0.219] [0.250] [0.252] [0.070] [0.071] [0.157] [0.158]
D Export status −0.010 −0.010 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.005 −0.007 −0.007 −0.015 −0.015
[0.022] [0.022] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.005] [0.005] [0.011] [0.011]
DWage 0.046 −0.012 0.056∗∗ −0.007∗ −0.008
[0.028] [0.016] [0.023] [0.004] [0.015]
D Skill supply 0.034∗∗ −0.007 0.039∗∗∗ −0.002 0.001
[0.016] [0.008] [0.013] [0.002] [0.008]
D Capital −0.005 −0.005 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ −0.005 −0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
D Hicks-neutral, v −0.043∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 −0.013∗∗ −0.013∗∗
[0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006]
D Foreign-owned −0.002 −0.003 −0.022 −0.021 0.006 0.003 −0.006 −0.006 0.014 0.014
[0.038] [0.038] [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.012] [0.012] [0.017] [0.017]
D R&D −0.010 −0.009 −0.020 −0.021 −0.012 −0.011 −0.005 −0.005 −0.011 −0.012
[0.027] [0.027] [0.019] [0.019] [0.021] [0.021] [0.007] [0.007] [0.014] [0.014]
D Training −0.011 −0.011 0.012 0.012 −0.003 −0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
[0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] [0.007]
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen Jp-value 0.334 0.311 0.369 0.392 0.214 0.253 0.159 0.142 0.137 0.118
No. of obs. 3366 3361 3366 3345 3366 3361 3366 3345 3366 3361
Notes: Robust standard errors are in square brackets. The sample of initial non-importers is used in all regressions. The education threshold used to determine a skilled production
worker is a highschool diploma, while the threshold used for a skilled non-production worker is a college degree. Import status is treated as an endogenous variable in all
regressions. It is instrumented with both the distance to port and the share of imports shipped by air.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗ p < 0.1.
As such, we conclude the plant-level changes in skill demand largely
occur through the extensive margin of importing.24
In the fourth panel (regressions (31)–(40)) we replace our mea-
sure of Hicks-neutral productivity with a conventional measure of
TFP. Speciﬁcally, we replace Hicks-neutral TFP with an estimate of
the Solow residual from a Cobb–Douglas production function which
uses capital, materials, production workers and non-production
workers as inputs. Again, we recover very similar point estimates
relative to our benchmark results.25
The ﬁfth panel addresses the concern that exporting is likely to
be an endogenous decision in this context. For instance, given the
evidence that importing and exporting are closely related activities
(see Kasahara and Lapham, 2013), ignoring the endogeneity of the
plant’s export decision may lead to bias in the estimated coeﬃcient
on import status. Regressions (41)–(50) estimate the skill equation
while instrumenting both import and export status with transport
costs, air share, and the changes output tariffs and market access tar-
iffs as deﬁned in Section 3.26 We continue to ﬁnd that importing has a
large, positive impact of the demand for skilled workers. In contrast,
24 If we exclude import status, the import intensity is always positive and statistically
signiﬁcant.
25 Hicks-neutral productivity is estimated to take a negative coeﬃcient in Tables 5–6,
while our naively estimated TFP takes the opposite sign in the fourth robustness check
of Table 8, even if it is always insigniﬁcant in this latter case. While these results
may seem contradictory, they are exactly what we should expect in this instance.
By ignoring the skill-biased component of productivity, the conventional TFP mea-
sure confuses both the skill-biased and Hicks-neutral components and, as a result, is
likely to be positively correlated with the demand for skilled labor. In contrast, the
Hicks-neutral productivity term we estimate disentangles these two components of
productivity. Plants with larger values of skill-biased productivity will naturally be
more likely to have smaller measured Hicks-neutral productivity.
26 First stage results for the decision to export can be found in the Appendix.
the impact of exporting on the demand for skill is estimated to be
insigniﬁcantly different from zero in all but one column.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) present a model with a con-
tinuum of goods where the most skill-intensive goods in developing
countries correspond to the least skill-intensive goods in developed
countries. Trade liberalization induces themost skill-intensive goods
in developing countries to be exported to developed countries, lead-
ing to an increase in the demand for skilled labor in developing
countries. The Feenstra and Hansen hypothesis does not appear to
hold in our data since none of the estimated coeﬃcients on exporting
are signiﬁcantly positive in regression (41)–(50).
Although we document evidence that importing leads to an
increase in the demand for skill, the mechanism behind this result
has been largely uninvestigated thus far. As we discussed, one plau-
sible mechanism is that importing induces the adoption of skill-
biased technology. While there is no direct data on foreign tech-
nology adoption, our data set includes a variable which captures
whether a plant adopts a standardized production process, such as
those recognized by the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (ISO) or the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).27
27 Speciﬁcally, the survey question asks “Does this establishment use standard of
production process?” with the following list of standards: ISO (International Organ-
isation for Standardization), IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission), ITU
(International Telecommunication Union), CAC (Codex Alimentarius Commission),
AFNOR (Association Francaise de Normalisation), ANSI (American National Standard
Institute), BIS (Bureau of India Standard), BSI (British Standards Institution), DIN
(Deutshes Institut für Normung ev), JISC (Japanese Industrial Standards Committee),
SAL (Standards Australia), SNI (Standar Nasional Indonesia), ASTM (American Society
for Testing and Material), ASME (American Standard of Mechanical Engineering), and
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). Unfortunately, no further information on
which standards are used is available.
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Table 8
Robustness checks.
Occupation threshold Production highschool Non-production college All highschool All college All occupation
Dep. var. ln(Lps /L
p
u)
(
Lps
Lps+L
p
u
)
ln(Lns /L
n
u)
(
Lns
Lns +L
n
u
)
ln(Ls/Lu)
(
Ls
Ls+Lu
)
ln(Ls/Lu)
(
Ls
Ls+Lu
)
ln(Ln/Lp)
(
Ln
Ln+Lp
)
IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Skill supply controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Import status 2.448∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 3.783∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗ 3.388∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 3.041∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.786 0.024
[1.364] [0.274] [1.344] [0.231] [1.684] [0.238] [1.268] [0.070] [0.812] [0.120]
Skill supply06 0.244∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.029 0.004∗ 0.035 0.003
[0.070] [0.012] [0.061] [0.008] [0.065] [0.011] [0.059] [0.002] [0.039] [0.006]
Skill supply96 −0.006 −0.008 −0.075 0.009 0.019 −0.006 0.038 0.003 0.052 0.006
[0.083] [0.015] [0.073] [0.008] [0.080] [0.013] [0.068] [0.002] [0.045] [0.006]
Large IV set
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Import status 3.240∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 3.498∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 4.105∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 3.191∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 1.557∗∗ 0.116
[1.247] [0.254] [1.049] [0.230] [1.496] [0.235] [1.072] [0.069] [0.746] [0.108]
Import intensity
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
Import status 7.309∗ 1.640∗∗ 5.498 1.420∗∗ 8.128∗ 1.458∗∗ 3.825 0.445∗∗ 2.945 0.148
[3.974] [0.658] [3.640] [0.675] [4.632] [0.600] [2.554] [0.179] [1.936] [0.238]
Import share −8.143 −1.479 −2.563 −1.445 −7.487 −1.200 −0.715 −0.354 −3.417 −0.116
[8.230] [1.365] [6.897] [1.323] [8.824] [1.233] [3.979] [0.375] [3.768] [0.475]
TFP measurement
(31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40)
Import status 3.151∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 3.885∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗ 3.968∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 3.264∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 1.226∗ 0.089
[1.211] [0.270] [1.133] [0.238] [1.451] [0.248] [1.072] [0.071] [0.729] [0.105]
Solow residual 0.001 0.011 0.023 0.014 0.022 0.008 0.031 0.003 −0.032 −0.000
[0.044] [0.009] [0.050] [0.008] [0.046] [0.008] [0.048] [0.002] [0.027] [0.004]
Instrumenting export status
(41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50)
Import status 2.977∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 4.240∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗ 4.446∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.933 0.191∗∗ 0.739 0.014
[1.289] [0.305] [1.701] [0.330] [1.840] [0.300] [0.893] [0.075] [0.825] [0.121]
Export status −0.551 0.073 0.232 0.136 0.142 0.088 −1.419∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.719 −0.093
[0.558] [0.124] [0.859] [0.116] [0.620] [0.120] [0.492] [0.029] [0.470] [0.070]
Standards
(51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60)
Standards 5.354∗ 1.365∗∗ 1.931∗ 0.828∗∗ 5.976∗ 1.220∗∗ 0.502 0.222∗∗ 1.053 −0.078
[3.000] [0.618] [1.148] [0.393] [3.083] [0.559] [0.816] [0.093] [1.230] [0.178]
Capital-skill complementarity
(61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70)
Import status 5.716∗∗∗ 1.476∗∗∗ 3.639∗ 0.525 7.500∗∗∗ 1.460∗∗∗ 3.113∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 2.609∗∗ 0.184
[2.130] [0.464] [2.060] [0.378] [2.901] [0.465] [1.521] [0.137] [1.159] [0.126]
Capital-skill comp. 0.388 0.081 −0.021 −0.017 0.513 0.114 −0.143 0.002 0.246 0.004
[0.511] [0.090] [0.567] [0.093] [0.862] [0.108] [0.423] [0.031] [0.189] [0.016]
Notes: Robust standard errors are in square brackets. The sample of initial non-importers is used in all regressions. Import status is treated as an endogenous variable in all
columns. Industry and region ﬁxed effects are included in all regressions. Columns (51)–(60) focus on the sample of non-exporters since exporting and production standardization
are highly correlated activities.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗ p < 0.1.
The use of standards may allow for improved coordination with
foreign suppliers, facilitating the adoption of foreign skill-biased
technology.
In the sixth panel, we estimate the effect of standards on the
demand for skilled production workers using our benchmark speci-
ﬁcations of Tables 5 and 6 but replacing the import dummy with a
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Table 9
Importing and standardized production.
Dep. var. Standards
Occupation threshold Production highschool Non-production college All highschool All college All occupation
IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Import status 1.491∗ 1.425∗ 1.819∗ 1.622∗ 2.268 1.395∗ 1.113 1.851∗ 1.467∗ 1.517∗
[0.877] [0.851] [1.002] [0.966] [2.112] [0.843] [1.282] [1.055] [0.850] [0.826]
Control vars. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen Jp-value 0.460∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.399 0.379 0.647 0.421 0.202 0.411 0.472 0.426
No. of obs. 3329 3329 329 2958 2720 3329 1194 3329 2958 3329
Notes: Robust standard errors are in square brackets. The sample of initial non-importers is used in all regressions. The education threshold used to determine a skilled production
worker is a highschool diploma, while the threshold used for a skilled non-production worker is a college degree. Import status is treated as an endogenous variable in all columns.
It is instrumented with both the distance to port and the share of imports shipped by air. All full set of control variables is included in each regression. Detailed results are reported
in the Appendix.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗ p < 0.1.
dummy for standardized production, where we focus on the sam-
ple of non-exporters since standardization is closely associated with
exporting activities.28 Regressions (51)–(60) indicate that the adop-
tion of standards signiﬁcantly increases the demand for both skilled
production and non-production workers.
To further explore the relationship between standardization and
importing, we also consider a linear regression model of the deci-
sion to adopt standardized production. In particular, we regress our
standardization dummy variable on import status and a full set of
controls using the sample of non-exporting ﬁrms.29 In all columns of
Table 9we ﬁnd that the point estimate on importing is both large and
positive. Moreover, in 8 out of 10 columns of Table 9 the estimate is
reported to be at least marginally signiﬁcant. Although these results
are hardly overwhelming, they are consistent with the hypothe-
sis that importing induces standardization and, thus, skill-biased
technological change.
Finally, we also consider whether importing leads to skill-
upgrading through a capital-skill complementarity mechanism,
rather than the framework posited in Section 2. We ﬁrst extend our
model to allow for potential capital-skill complementarity as pre-
sented in Appendix E. The ﬁrm’s costminimization problemwill then
imply that the relative demand for skilled labor can be written as:
Ljs
Lju
=
(
b
Wu
Ws
)sj
(A j)sj−1
(
K
(Lps + Lns )
)(sj−1)(1−b)
(10)
It is clear that capital-skill complementarity implies adding one addi-
tional variable to our benchmark empirical speciﬁcation, the log ratio
of capital to total (production and non-production) skilled labor,
ln
(
K/(Lps + Lns )
)
. Unfortunately, including ln
(
K/(Lps + Lns )
)
on the
right-hand side of Eq. (5) is likely to induce endogeneity bias since
skilled labor determines both outcome and explanatory variables.
As such, regressions (61)–(70) of Table 8 document IV estimates
of the impact of importing on the demand skilled labor while also
instrumenting the endogenous capital-skill control using lagged (i.e.,
1996) values of ln
(
K/(Ljs + L
j
s)
)
as an additional instrument. We ﬁnd
that the impact of importing on the demand for skilled production
workers is nearly unaffected by controlling for capital-skill comple-
mentarity; the point estimates on the import status variable are of a
28 Transport costs are typically strong predictors of the use of standards.
29 Explicitly instrumenting for endogenous export decisions returns very similar
point estimates and statistical signiﬁcance for the import status variable.
similar magnitude and signiﬁcance as the benchmark regressions in
Tables 5 and 6.
5. Marginal treatment effects
5.1. Propensity scores
We estimate the import probabilities for each plant using a
logit speciﬁcation where we include the interaction terms between
instruments and the lagged value of the outcome variable in 1996 as
well as dummy variables for plants that did not hire any skilled or
unskilled workers in 1996. Transport costs, air shares, and weights
are included as instruments. Table B.3 in the Appendix reports the
estimate of the coeﬃcient and marginal derivative for each vari-
able with bootstrapped standard errors, wherewe ﬁnd that transport
costs and air shares are always a strong predictor of importing.
Fig. 2 plots the distribution of estimated propensity scores for
importing and non-importing plants. It is evident that the com-
mon support of the propensity scores across importing and non-
importing plants does not span the full unit interval. For this reason,
we restrict our computation of treatment effects to the region where
there is signiﬁcant overlap between the propensity scores of non-
importing and importing plants as reported in the second to last
row of Table 10; speciﬁcally, treatment effects are computed over
the region where the minimum and maximum values are given by
the 1st percentile and the 99th percentile values of the estimated
propensity scores for which we have common support, respectively.
Because there are very few non-importing plants with propensity
scores beyond the upper bound of this range, it is diﬃcult to apply
nonparametric methods and conﬁdently estimate theMTE outside of
this range.
5.2. Treatment effects
Fig. 3 plots the estimated relationships between the MTE and UD
along with 90%(equal-tailed) bootstrap conﬁdence bands across 5
different outcome variables using the share of skilled workers as the
dependent variable.30 As shown in Fig. 3 (a)–(d), the estimated MTE
30 The import decision model is estimated for each bootstrap sample so that the ﬁrst
stage estimation error is taken into account. Table B.1 in the Appendix reports the esti-
mates of the skill demand equation using the sample of plants for which the estimated
propensity scores are on the estimated common support. The results for using the log
of the skill ratios as the outcome variables are reported in Fig. B.5 and are similar to
those in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 2. Support of estimated propensity scores.
curve for production workers is well above zero for small values of
UD and is downward sloping for all of our four education-based skill
measures. These ﬁndings provide evidence that plants self-selected
into importing based on the plant-speciﬁc, unobserved component of
the net beneﬁt from importing—among plants that choose to import
when their propensity scores, estimated in terms of observables, are
low, the unobserved ability to adopt the skilled biased technology
must be high. On the other hand, in Fig. 3 (e), when we use the share
of non-production workers as the outcome variable, the estimated
MTE curve is not signiﬁcantly different from zero across all values
of UD.
Fig. 4 graphs the estimated weights for computing different
treatment parameters whenwe use Lps /(L
p
s +L
p
u) as the outcome vari-
able. In Fig. 4 (a), the TT heavily overweights individual plants with
low levels of UD while the TUT overweights those with high levels of
UD. By construction, the ATE equally weights different values of UD.
If the MTE curve were ﬂat, there would be no self-selection based
on the unobservable gains, and the ATE would equal to the TT and
the TUT. The fact that the estimated MTE curve is downward sloping
suggests the presence of selection bias from the unobserved, het-
erogeneous return to importing and invalidates the use of a simpler
propensity score matching methods for estimating the ATE in our
context.
Table 10 reports the estimates of various summary measures of
the impact of importing on skill demand: the ATE, the TT, the TUT,
and policy relevant treatment effects (the MPRTEs and the PRTEs).
These treatment effects are computed as the weighted averages of
the MTE, where these weights integrate to one over the restricted
support reported in the second to last row of Table 10. Bootstrap
standard errors and the 90% equal-tailed bootstrap conﬁdence inter-
val are reported in square brackets and parentheses, respectively.
Appendix B discusses the details of our estimation procedure.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 10 report the estimated treat-
ment effects for production workers. The ATE, the TT, and the TUT
for production workers are estimated to be positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, indicating that importing increases the demand
for educated production workers across different groups of plants.
Furthermore, the TT is estimated to be substantially larger than
the ATE which, in turn, is larger than the TUT. This is potentially
indicative of substantial unobserved heterogeneity in the effect of
importing on skill demand across plants and that plants with greater
returns from importing self-select into importing. While plants that
were induced to import witnessed large increases in the demand
for skilled production workers, the counterfactual impact of import-
ing on the demand for skilled production workers is substantially
smaller among plants that chose not to import in 2006.
Table 10
Treatment effects of importing on skill demand.
Occupation threshold Production highschool Non-production college All highschool All college All occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent var. ln
(
Lps
Lpu
)
06
(
Lps
Lpu+L
p
s
)
06
ln
(
Lns
Lnu
)
06
(
Lns
Lnu+L
n
s
)
06
ln
(
Ls
Lu
)
06
(
Ls
Lu+Ls
)
06
ln
(
Ls
Lu
)
06
(
Ls
Lu+Ls
)
06
ln
(
Lp
Lp
)
06
(
Lp
Lp+Lp
)
06
ATE 1.897 0.690 3.231 0.623 2.390 0.651 2.099 0.188 0.496 0.084
[0.926]a [0.175] [0.883] [0.146] [0.734] [0.199] [0.751] [0.046] [0.608] [0.102]
(0.70,3.82)b (0.51,1.07) (2.75,5.67) (0.45,0.95) (1.72,4.08) (0.46,1.13) (1.31,3.71) (0.14,0.29) (−0.34,1.69) (−0.04,0.29)
TT 5.041 2.127 4.193 1.235 6.377 2.477 3.153 0.442 1.663 0.368
[2.158] [0.581] [1.521] [0.408] [2.223] [0.703] [1.255] [0.113] [1.704] [0.312]
(2.66,9.61) (1.59,3.46) (3.11,7.95) (0.74,2.14) (4.62,12.04) (1.96,4.18) (1.91,6.09) (0.34,0.73) (−0.31,5.36) (−0.01,0.98)
TUT 1.543 0.550 3.093 0.563 2.027 0.492 1.905 0.163 0.379 0.057
[0.871] [0.145] [0.824] [0.131] [0.671] [0.164] [0.694] [0.043] [0.553] [0.086]
(0.46,3.30) (0.39,0.85) (2.67,5.38) (0.39,0.85) (1.35,3.52) (0.32,0.88) (1.10,3.35) (0.11,0.25) (−0.40,1.42) (−0.06,0.23)
MPRTE 4.379 1.859 3.904 1.104 5.692 2.091 2.932 0.393 1.471 0.313
(P∗a = P+ a) [1.867] [0.494] [1.356] [0.351] [1.911] [0.588] [1.135] [0.098] [1.455] [0.267]
(2.34,8.32) (1.39,2.99) (2.98,7.32) (0.69,1.89) (4.18,10.48) (1.65,3.51) (1.79,5.59) (0.31,0.64) (−0.19,4.58) (−0.01,0.85)
MPRTE 4.241 1.793 3.834 1.078 5.500 2.000 2.896 0.384 1.425 0.301
(Zk∗a = Zk + a) [1.783] [0.477] [1.319] [0.340] [1.800] [0.568] [1.114] [0.095] [1.372] [0.257]
(2.27,8.07) (1.34,2.88) (2.90,7.16) (0.68,1.83) (4.11,10.01) (1.55,3.36) (1.76,5.53) (0.30,0.62) (−0.13,4.37) (−0.00,0.81)
PRTE 4.518 1.915 3.949 1.138 5.819 2.185 2.951 0.405 1.507 0.323
[6.640] [0.518] [1.394] [0.366] [2.236] [0.623] [1.143] [0.102] [1.494] [0.273]
(2.43,8.73) (1.43,3.10) (2.99,7.40) (0.70,1.95) (4.30,10.74) (1.72,3.68) (1.81,5.64) (0.31,0.66) (−0.19,4.69) (−0.00,0.87)
Supportc [0.01,0.58] [0.01,0.58] [0.00,0.57] [0.01,0.57] [0.01,0.60] [0.01,0.59] [0.01,0.54] [0.01,0.56] [0.00,0.56] [0.01,0.54]
No. of obs.d 2820 3997 1898 3992 3452 3985 2216 3967 3960 4000
a The bootstrap standard errors are in square brackets.
b The bootstrap equal-tailed 90% conﬁdence intervals are in parentheses.
c The minimum and the maximum values of support over which treatment effects are computed; various treatment effects are computed by restricting the weights to integrate
to one in the restricted support, for which minimum and maximum values are determined by the 1st percentile and the 99th percentile of observations in the common support,
respectively.
d The sample size for estimating the MTE curve.
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Fig. 3. Estimated MTE.
As columns (3)–(8) of Table 10 show, we observe similar patterns
for the ordering among the TT, the ATE, and the TUT across different
education-based measures of skill demand. However, the skill mea-
sures based on the ratio of non-production to production workers
reported in columns (9)–(10) indicate that the ATE, the TT, and the
TUT are not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Table 11 examines the robustness of our results using different
speciﬁcations and estimation methods, where we focus on the share
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Fig. 4. Estimated weights for ATE, TT, TUT, MPRTEs, and PRTE (dependent variable:
Lps /(L
p
s + L
p
u)).
of skilled workers within production workers or non-production
workers as the outcome variable. Columns (1) and (5) report the esti-
mates of treatment effects when we use conventional TFP in place
of our estimated Hicks-neutral productivity. In columns (2) and (6),
we estimate the partial linear model (11) where we use a sieve esti-
mator based on the 4th order polynomials in P(Z) instead of the
local polynomial estimator. Columns (3) and (7) consider a speciﬁca-
tion of the skill demand equation without any interactions between
the instruments and the lagged outcome variable, while columns (4)
and (8) estimate treatment effects over the estimated common sup-
port instead of the subset of the common support deﬁned by the 1st
percentile and the 99th percentile of observations that are on the
common support.31 The estimates of the ATE, the TT, and the TUT in
31 To estimate the treatment effects reported in Table 11, we use the same speciﬁca-
tion for the decision to import as the speciﬁcation reported in Table B.3 except that, in
columns (3) and (7), we exclude the interaction terms between the instruments and
the 1996 value of the log of skill ratio from the set of explanatory variables.
columns (1)–(8) of Table 11 are signiﬁcantly positive and exhibit the
patterns similar to those reported in columns (2) and (4) of Table 10.
5.3. Policy experiment
Our IV and MTE estimates conﬁrm that importing has a substan-
tial impact on the demand for skilled production workers. Nonethe-
less, it is less clear howmuchmore skill-upgradingwould be induced
by further changes in policy related variables. To examine this
issue, we consider alternative policies that change the probability of
importing but do not affect potential outcomes or the unobservables
related to import decisions, (S0, S1,V) deﬁned in Eqs. (6)–(7), and
compute the mean effect of going from a baseline policy to an alter-
native policy per plant shifted into importing. This treatment effect
is called the Policy Relevant Treatment Effect (PRTE) as proposed by
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2007b). Let P∗(Z) and P(Z) denote the
propensity scores under an alternative policy and a baseline policy,
respectively.
We consider the alternative policy of reducing the cost of ship-
ping goods to the nearest port by 10% so that P∗(Z) is set to the
propensity score under the alternative transport cost of TC∗ = 0.9TC.
The PRTE under this alternative policy captures the causal impact
that a marginal improvement in roads and infrastructure would have
on the relative demand for skilled workers across plants. Note that
this policy change will have a heterogeneous impact across plants.
We compute the estimate of what the PRTE would be when we
restrict the support of the propensity scores to the restricted sup-
port reported in the second to the last row of Table 10.32 We also
compute the marginal version of the PRTE called the Marginal Pol-
icy Relevant Treatment Effect (MPRTE) proposed by Carneiro et al.
(2010). Given a sequence of alternative policies indexed by a scalar
variable a such that lima→0P∗a(Z) = P(Z), the MPRTE is deﬁned as the
limit of a sequence of PRTEs as a approaches zero. We consider two
policy sequences as described in Carneiro et al. (2010): (i) a policy
that increases the probability of importing by a so that P∗a = P + a
and (ii) a policy that shifts one of the components in Z, say Zk, so that
Zka = Z
k+a. Fig. 4 (b) shows that the estimated weights for comput-
ing theMPRTEs and the PRTE overweights individual plants with low
levels of UD but put less weights on the very low levels of UD than
those for TT.
As reported in columns (1)–(8) of the lower panel of Table 10,
the estimates of the MPRTEs and the PRTE indicate that the sub-
set of plants that would be induced to start importing by further
policy change would substantially increase their demand for skilled
workers when we use the education-based skill measures. These
estimates are not sensitive to changes in speciﬁcations and estima-
tion methods on the whole as shown in the lower panel of Table 11.
In contrast, when we use the share of non-production workers as
the outcome variable, the estimates of the MPRTEs and the PRTE are
not signiﬁcantly different from zero, providing no evidence that fur-
ther importing would affect the demand for non-production workers
relative to production workers.
6. Conclusion
This paper studies the impact that importing foreign materi-
als has on the demand for educated workers among Indonesian
manufacturing plants. We develop a model of heterogeneous manu-
facturing plants where the decision to import may be inﬂuenced by
32 As discussed in Carneiro et al. (2010), the PRTE is not identiﬁable without strong
support conditions. To compute the estimate of what the PRTE would be on the
restricted support, we replace the value of the propensity scores with the maximum
value of the support whenever the value of the propensity scores under the alterna-
tive policy are larger than the maximum value of the restricted support so that all of
the propensity scores under the alternative policy lie on the restricted support.
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Table 11
Robustness check: treatment effects of importing on skill demand for production workers.
Occupation threshold Production highschool Non-production college
Dep. var.
(
Lps
Lpu+L
p
s
)
06
(
Lns
Lnu+L
n
s
)
06
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Replace v Use sieve No Treatment Replace Use sieve No Treatment
with in place of interaction effects over with in place of interaction effects over
TFP local poly. with Z common support TFP local poly. with Z common support
ATE 0.690 0.645 0.819 0.539 0.623 0.502 0.547 0.911
[0.173]a [0.158] [0.209] [0.281] [0.146] [0.150] [0.139] [0.270]
(0.51,1.07)b (0.48,1.00) (0.60,1.27) (0.18,1.04) (0.45,0.95) (0.28,0.77) (0.39,0.86) (0.82,1.74)
TT 2.127 2.168 2.370 2.140 1.235 0.970 1.573 1.242
[0.583] [0.560] [0.731] [0.592] [0.406] [0.473] [0.454] [0.415]
(1.59,3.46) (1.63,3.49) (1.50,3.90) (1.56,3.46) (0.76,2.14) (0.14,1.78) (1.11,2.57) (0.76,2.15)
TUT 0.550 0.509 0.671 0.435 0.563 0.460 0.447 0.910
[0.143] [0.135] [0.169] [0.298] [0.131] [0.139] [0.118] [0.292]
(0.39,0.86) (0.36,0.81) (0.50,1.04) (0.01,0.95) (0.40,0.85) (0.24,0.70) (0.30,0.69) (0.79,1.81)
MPRTE 1.859 1.855 2.055 1.861 1.104 0.877 1.343 1.108
(P∗a = P+ a) [0.496] [0.466] [0.607] [0.500] [0.350] [0.389] [0.383] [0.355]
(1.41,2.96) (1.44,2.94) (1.34,3.32) (1.33,2.97) (0.70,1.87) (0.23,1.56) (0.96,2.19) (0.70,1.90)
MPRTE 1.793 1.776 1.996 1.795 1.078 0.858 1.296 1.080
(Zk∗a = Zk + a) [0.478] [0.447] [0.589] [0.483] [0.339] [0.371] [0.372] [0.347]
(1.37,2.86) (1.37,2.81) (1.30,3.21) (1.29,2.85) (0.68,1.82) (0.25,1.52) (0.92,2.11) (0.68,1.84)
PRTE 1.915 1.928 2.140 1.966 1.138 0.902 1.403 1.162
[0.519] [0.492] [0.644] [1.291] [0.364] [0.413] [0.402] [0.425]
(1.45,3.08) (1.48,3.09) (1.39,3.49) (1.34,3.19) (0.72,1.94) (0.20,1.61) (0.99,2.30) (0.70,2.01)
Supportc [0.01,0.58] [0.01,0.58] [0.01,0.56] [0.00,0.87] [0.01,0.57] [0.01,0.57] [0.01,0.55] [0.00,0.87]
No. of obs.d 3997 3997 4006 3997 3992 3992 3993 3992
a The bootstrap standard errors are in square brackets.
b The bootstrap equal-tailed 90% conﬁdence intervals are in parentheses.
c The minimum and the maximum values of support over which treatment effects are computed; various treatment effects are computed by restricting the weights to integrate
to one in the restricted support, for which minimum and maximum values are determined by the 1st percentile and the 99th percentile of observations in the common support,
respectively.
d The sample size for estimating the MTE curve.
the adoption of skill-biased technology. In our model the degree to
which importing induces skill-biased technological change is poten-
tially heterogenous across plants and unobservable to the researcher.
To the extent that importing affects skill-biased productivity we
would expect that it will directly impact mix of skilled and unskilled
workers hired by Indonesian manufacturers.
To estimate the impact of importing on the demand for skilled
workers we exploit detailed data from the Indonesian manufactur-
ing survey. Our data documents the education level of every worker
in every manufacturing plant with at least 20 employees. Deﬁning
a skilled worker as one with a high school education for produc-
tion workers and one with a college education for non-production
workers, we ﬁnd that importing greatly increases the demand for
educated workers among Indonesian importers within each of occu-
pation categories. We also document evidence that the effect of
importing on the demand for educated workers is heterogeneous
across plants. In particular, plants that were induced to import
during our sample period were estimated to be those with gener-
ally high returns from importing. We further ﬁnd that policies that
improve transportation infrastructure in Indonesia would encourage
new plants to start importing and increase the demand for edu-
cated workers among new importers. Notably, however, when we
repeat our experiments using a conventionalmeasure of relative skill
demand, deﬁned as the ratio of non-production to production work-
ers, we often ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact of importing on the demand
for skilled labor.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.07.008.
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